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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse the impact of policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment strategies. The 
paper follows the real options approach, which allows to investigate the value to a firm of waiting to 
invest and/or disinvest, when payoffs are stochastic due to political uncertainty and investments are 
partially reversible. Across the board we find that political uncertainty can be very detrimental to FDI 
decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) literature is extensive and consists of three mainstream models. 
The so-called OLI model is a model that tries to identify the attractiveness of a country for foreign 
investors on the basis of ownership, location and internationalisation factors [Dunning (1993)]. The 
gravity model tries to predict FDI flows on the basis of macroeconomic variables like the level of 
GDP, GDP growth and the population size [Brenton and Gros (1997), Brenton and Di Mauro (1998), 
Brock (1998)]. The transaction costs models try to determine which mode of investment is most suited 
for a business based on its cost structure [Buckley and Casson (1981)]. This stream of research 
examines firm choices among alternative market-servicing modes, such as exporting, licensing, or 
joint ventures in addition to full ownership. 
Contrary to this literature, the recent literature on investment interprets a firm as consisting of a 
portfolio of options, and uses options-based pricing techniques to study the investment decision. The 
general idea behind the idea that investment opportunities are option-rights is that each investment 
project can be assimilated, in its nature, to the purchase of a financial call option, where the investor 
pays a premium price in order to get the right to buy an asset for some time at a predetermined price 
(exercise price), and eventually different from the spot market price of the asset (strike price). 
Analogously, the firm, in its investment decision, pays a price (the cost of setting up the project) which 
gives her the right to use the capital (exercise price), now or in the future, in return for an asset worth a 
strike price. Taking into account this options-based approach, the calculus of profitability cannot be 
done simply applying the net present value rule to the expected future cash flows of the operation, but 
has rather to consider the following three characteristics of the investment decision: 
1. there is uncertainty about future payoffs from the investment; 
2. the investment does not entail a now-or-never decision and 
3. the investment is at least partially irreversible. 
The three characteristics imply that the opportunity cost of investment includes the value of the option 
to wait that is extinguished when an investment decision is taken. Therefore, the investment decision 
is affected by the determinants of the value of this option and consequently, an appropriate 
identification of the optimal exercise strategies for real options plays a crucial role in the maximisation 
of a firm´s value. 
The real options studied in the literature include, other things equal, operating options [McDonald and 
Siegel (1985)], the option to wait and undertake an investment later [McDonald and Siegel (1986)] 
and uncertainty from future interest rates [Ingersoll and Ross (1992)]. More recent contributions to the 
literature include Abel and Eberly (1994, 1997) and Abel et al. (1996).1 Almost uniformly, this litera-
                                                                 
1 The literature is too vast to survey here. Excellent surveys of the real options literature are provided by Amran 
and Kulatilaka (1999), Copeland and Antikarov (2001), Coy (1999), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Lander and 
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ture focuses on the effect of demand, price and/or exchange rate uncertainty upon investment 
decisions of firms. The scope of this paper is to apply the real option theory to the case of  foreign 
direct investment under political instability, i.e. we aim to explain FDI decisions with a specific focus  
on the political environment. The sources of political risk include, inter alia, an unreliable legal 
system, potential capital expropriation, major government crisis, separatist movements, nationalization 
policies, the imposition of foreign exchange and capital controls, and the institution of tariffs and 
barriers.2 
From the policy viewpoint, an extremely important form of uncertainty faced by investors is the 
imperfect credibility of policy reforms. Investment-friendly reforms typically raise expected returns, 
but may also increase uncertainty if investors believe that the reform measures could be reversed. In 
such context, investors’ perceptions about the probability of policy reversal become a key determinant 
of the investment response. These issues are explored by Rodrick (1991) using a model in which 
investment involves sunk costs of entry and exit. He shows that a reform favourable to capital, but 
regarded as less than fully credible, will fail to trigger off an investment response unless the return on 
capital becomes high enough to compensate investors for the losses they would incur should the 
reversal take place. Similar qualitative conclusions are reached by van Wijnbergen (1985) who 
considers the case of a trade reform suspected to be only temporary.3 
The hypothesis that an unstable political environment can become a powerful aggregate investment 
deterrent seems to be supported by mounting empirical evidence. Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) find that measures of government instability, unrest and political violence are significantly 
related to cross-country differences in investment and growth. Keefer and Knack (1995) show that 
indicators of uncertainties in property rights enforcement (perceived risk of expropriation and 
repudiation of contracts) derived from expert surveys are negatively associated with private 
investment performance across countries. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) and Mauro (1995) find that 
political uncertainty and an aggregate institutional indicator (a bribery and corruption indicator) is 
negatively associated with aggregate investment spending. Finally, Brunetti and Weder (1998) have 
found that high corruption, a lack of rule of law, and volatility in real exchange rate distortions are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Pinches (1998). Graham and Harvey (2001) survey a large representative set of US firms and find that a quarter 
of them incorporates the real options of a project when evaluating it. 
2 Most of the FDI literature [including the papers reviewed by Markusen and Maskus (2001)] relies on non-
stochastic models. One exeption is Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) who study the effects of exchange rate 
uncertainty on FDI. Culem (1988) and Garibaldi et al. (2002) confirm the general finding that the quality of 
institutions and governance and macroeconomic stability are important factors in determining the level and 
regional allocation of FDI flows. A comparison of the results of different surveys on FDI in the Central and 
Eastern European countries is provided in European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1994), p. 130. 
3 It should be pointed out, however, that a higher level of investment may encourage the host government to 
change policies in the future, so that a firm anticipating this kind of time inconsistency will tend to be self-
protective, assuming that the jump parameter is positively correlated with the stock of invested capital and 
therefore an endogenous variable. See Cherian and Perotti (2001) for a discussion of the effects of strategic 
interactions drawing inspirations from the time-inconsistency literature. In the context of transition economies, a 
number of governments have employed external policy bindings like the eastern enlargement of the EU as a 
means to alleviate investor concerns about policy uncertainty.  
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most detrimental to aggregate investment spending. The literature concerning the empirical 
investigation of the main macroeconomic determinants of FDI flows, also connotes the importance of 
political and economic instability.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. The next section of the paper describes the 
model and assumptions, drawing inspiration from the real options literature. In section 3, we derive the 
analytical solution and section 4 contains a numerical analysis. Finally, section 5 provides a summary 
and some general comments pertaining to policy implications and future research. 
 
2. The Basic Model of Investment with Adjustment Costs  
 
Consider the problem of a firm whose production is located exclusively at home but is contemplating 
expanding its production capabilities abroad. The firm will engage in FDI only if such a move is 
deemed to be beneficial in the medium and long run. In order to focus on the impact of uncertainty, we 
assume zero transportation costs. Hence, proximity to the consumer does not play a role in 
determining production patterns. Formally, we assume an economy where the individual firm 
maximises the intertemporal objective function 
 
(1) ( ) ( )( )ò -= ¥ -0 dteICKV rtttp  
 
where p(×) is the twice differentiable maximised value of the firm’s instantaneous profits with pK > 0 
and pKK < 0, r is the discount rate, and C(×) are the total investment expenditures.4 The firm is risk-
neutral, but the owners may be risk averse.5 These standard assumptions guarantee that the firm’s 
problem is well-behaved. The total costs of investment are determined by  
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Fixed costs aK are non-negative costs of investment that are independent of the level of investment. 
However, a firm can avoid these fixed costs by setting investment to zero. Purchase (sale) costs are the 
costs of buying (selling) capital. Let pK
+  ( pK
- ) be the price per unit of investment good at which the 
                                                                 
4 In the model, capital is the only fixed factor, while other productive inputs (e.g., labour) can be costlessly 
adjusted in the face of changing prices. In other words, p(×) accounts for whatever optimisation the firm can do 
on dimensions other than K. 
5 The assumption of risk-neutrality can be relaxed and risk aversion can be assumed instead by using the CAPM 
and calculating a risk-adjusted discount rate. See Harrison and Kreps (1979), for example.  
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firm can buy (sell) any amount of capital. We assume that pK
+  ³ pK
-  ³ 0.6 Adjustment costs c(×) are 
continuous and strictly convex in I satisfying c(0) = 0, cI > 0 and cII > 0. Considering the depreciation 
of capital, the adjustment of capital over time is denoted by  
 
(3) KI
dt
dK d-= ,  
 
where d  represents the depreciation rate. To solve the model, we consider the Bellman equation 
 
(4)  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )KIqICK
dt
dVE
ICKrV dpp -+-=+-= . 
 
The first condition characterising the optimum is the derivative of the Bellman equation with respect 
to the control variable (I) is zero, i.e. 
 
(5) qcp IK =+
-+ , 
 
where q º KV  denotes Tobin´s marginal q. Note that since CI  is increasing in I, equation (5) implies 
that investment is increasing in q, i.e. 
 
(6) ( )qfI tt =     with 0)1( / ==-+pf K and 0>¢f . 
 
The above model of investment has at least one failure as a description of actual behaviour. Our 
analysis so far assumes that firms are certain about future revenues. In practice, however, they face 
uncertainty. Thus we need to modify the model if we are to obtain a reasonable picture of actual 
foreign direct investment decision. To evaluate such impacts, it is necessary to recognise that 
investment and production are inherently dynamic and uncertain processes. Acknowledging the high 
degree of irreversibility associated with FDI ventures, let’s assume that FDI decisions may be 
represented by a set of real options to acquire productive assets abroad. Consequently, an appropriate 
identification of the optimal exercise strategies for real options plays a crucial role in the maximisation 
of the firm’s value. So far, the real options literature provides relatively little insight into the impact of 
institutional and policy uncertainty on the investment decision of a firm although many people would 
agree with the view that policy uncertainty and instability can be serious obstacles to fixed investment 
decisions. The existing papers mainly consider continuous changes in the value of relevant variables. 
                                                                 
6 Thus, we relax the assumption that FDI be irreversible. Instead we assume that reversibility is a continuous 
 6 
This, most of the time, results in the assumption that the entire uncertainty in the economy can be 
described by a geometric Brownian motion. 7 It is, however, more realistic to model institutional and 
policy uncertainty as a process that makes infrequent but discrete jumps. In such cases, use can be 
made of the Poisson jump process.8 
On the supply side of the economy, we assume that the present value of operating profits is given by 
 
(7) ( ) at gKK =p  
 
where the productivity parameter g is intended to proxy for all aspects of the environment of the host 
country impinging on the incentive to invest, such as demand and exchange rate fluctuations, capital 
control regulations, weak and poorly enforced property rights, government instability, unstable 
incentive frameworks, discontinuous changes in the tax environment, social unrest, etc. In other 
words, g measures the host country’s potential in generating profits. In this paper, we propose a simple 
unifying framework where the parameter g is allowed to jump or drop, combined with continuous-
time stochastic process. Consequently, our objective is to model explicitly the dynamics of policy 
uncertainty and its effect on foreign direct investment when the firm has incomplete information about 
the moment of the change. This feature of the policy process is particularly relevant in developing 
countries and transition countries where investors may be particularly wary of the potential for radical 
and unexpected swings in economic policy. It is assumed that g follows the combined geometric 
Brownian motion and jump process  
 
(8)  21 ttvsh ddgdgdtdg +++= , 
 
where v  is a Wiener process; dtd ev =  (since e  is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), h is the drift parameter, s the variance parameter, dt1 
and dt2 are the increments of Poisson processes (with mean arrival rates l1 and l2). With this process, 
h is the expected growth rate of profitability, i.e. E[(gt/gt)|gt] = exp[h(t-t)] for t ³ t.9 It is assumed that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
rather than a dichotomous concept. The assumption of complete irreversibility is given by 0=-pK . 
7 The use of option-pricing models that capture the role of uncertainty in international economics is well-
established since the mid 1980s. Some of the most influential contributions focused on providing a theoretical 
argument to explain the hysteretic effect that the large exchange rate swings of the 1980s had on trade prices and 
quantities. Foreign firms that entered the U.S. market during the first half of the 1980s, when the real U.S. Dollar 
exchange rate was appreciating, could not exit when the U.S. Dollar returned to its original level due to the sunk 
costs incurred. The exchange rate would have had to decline strictly below the level that triggered entry in order 
to induce firms to exit [see, for example, Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989)].  
8 An interesting recent application is provided by Hassett and Metcalf (1999) who analyse changes in the 
investment tax credit in a setting where a Pois son process describes discrete changes in the tax regime. 
9 The drift parameter may represent productivity improvements during the catching-up process of transition 
economies.  
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if an “event 1” (“event 2”) occurs, g increases (falls) by f1 (f2) percent with probability 1. Over each 
time interval dt there is a probability l1dt (or l2dt) that it will rise (drop) by f1g (f2g) and Z fluctuates 
until next event occurs. Additionally, we assume that (dq1, dq2) and dv  are independent to each 
other, i.e. ( ) 01 =tvddE , ( ) 02 =tvddE , and E(dt1dt2) = 0. Equation (8) indicates that there are two 
sources of uncertainty. Type I uncertainty represented by the geometric Brownian motion captures 
exchange rate and/or demand uncertainty. Instability of this type may be helpful in predicting the 
variability in investment returns, but it is not the type of risk that is most important to FDI decisions. 
To understand FDI behaviour, we should focus on the large downside risks that we expect to be 
resolved and where new information is arriving. We have therefore additionally assumed type II 
uncertainty (represented by the independent jump processes). This newly added uncertainty represents 
political and/or institutional uncertainty.10 In our work, the timing of the potential policy shifts is 
exogenous.11 
To complete the economic model, we are assuming quadratic costs of adjustment in order to replicate 
the empirical fact that the capital stock displays considerable smoothness and inertia  
 
(9) ( ) IIc 2
2
g
= . 
 
In the scenario hypothesised below, it is assumed that the firm assigns constant probabilities of the 
government changing policy, i.e. it is time itself and not the state of the economy that governs the 
change. The next section solves the real options setup under political uncertainty. 
 
3. Solution to the Optimal Stopping Problem 
 
The decision whether or not to engage in FDI constitutes an optimal stopping problem, for which the 
relevant Bellman equation is 
 
                                                                 
10 We generalise the model by also introducing generic demand and/or exchange rate risk, orthogonal to political 
risk, in order to produce a general real options model. There are a few papers that have performed related work 
but none has emphasized the interaction between type I and type II sources of uncertainty that surround FDI 
decisions. On a methodological level, the closest work to hours is that of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 303-309. 
The OLI theory of FDI includes among the location advantages of a host country a variable „political stability“. 
However, the OLI framework fails  to formalise this issue in a coherent economic model. 
11 An important assumption of the model is that investment does not resolve political uncertainty, it is time that 
resolves uncertainty. Clearly, this assumption will not be valid for other types of uncertainty in which the firm 
gains the critical information because it has invested. For example, R&D investments will give the firm 
information about the likelihood of a product´s success. In practical terms, we are not exploring endogenous 
uncertainty but exogenous uncertainty that may (or may not) be resolved with time but cannot be resolved by 
action on part of the firm. 
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and the optimal condition for I is denoted by  
 
(11) 
g
g
-+
-+ -=Þ=+ KK
pq
IqIp . 
 
In this framework, the optimal investment strategy is a two-trigger policy that can be expressed in 
terms of Tobin´s q. If q exceeds the upper threshold qK
+  gross investment occurs. In turn, if q falls 
below a lower threshold qK
- , negative investment takes place – the firm sells part of its capital stock. 
In the region of inaction +- ££ KK pqp , investment equals zero. Table 1 gives the intuition behind this 
result. 
 
Table 1: The Optimality Conditions  
 Marginal Benefit (MB)  Marginal Cost (MC) MB=MC and I = 0 
I>0 Firm’s value raised by q Buying additional K for price +Kp  and 
paying for marginal adjustment 
cost for K: Ig  
Ipq K g+=
+
+  
+
+ =Þ Kpq  
I<0 Selling the redundant K 
 for -Kp  
Firm’s value reduced by q and  
paying for marginal adjustment 
cost for K: Ig-  since I is negative 
-
- =- KpIq g  
-
- =Þ Kpq  
 
Given (11), the firm´s solution to the optimal stopping time requires  
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g 2
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or, equivalently 
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Substituting into the Bellman equation (10) we have 
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Using the definitions KVq = , Kgg Vq = , KKK Vq =  and Kgggg Vq =  and differentiating both sides 
with respect to K, we are able to rewrite (14) in the following form: 
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The optimal stopping problem is simplified by observing that we have += Kpq  and 
-= Kpq  within the 
no-action region. In this case, equation (15) therefore takes the following simpler form 
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The solutions for (16) consist of the particular and general solutions, i.e. =+= GP qqq -+ /Kp . Given 
the above model, we can show that the following holds:12 
 
(17) 
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where 1A  and 1A  are unknown parameters and b1 and b2 are the positive and negative roots of the 
characteristic equation (19),  respectively. The set of boundary conditions that applies to this optimal 
stopping problem is composed by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions 
 
                                                                 
12 See Appendix A and B for formal proofs. Outside and inside the no-action-area, the problem in its general 
form has no closed form solution because the term 
( )
g
KK qpq
-+-
does not disappear.  
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The value matching conditions require the equality between the net present value of the project and the 
value of the option. The smooth pasting conditions require the equality between the slopes of the net 
present value of the investment project and the value of the option. Equations (19) – (23) determine 
the two thresholds (g+ and g-) that bisect the firm´s decision-making space into a zone where it is 
optimal to exercise the option and a no action zone where the firm maximises its value by leaving the 
option unexercised. In other words, in the no action range between g+ and g- the firm´s optimal policy 
is to continue with the status quo, i.e. the firm will neither invest nor disinvest.    
The next section makes use of numerical techniques to generate simulations of the demand of fixed 
assets exposed to political risk. 
 
4. Numerical Simulations  
 
To have a feel on the quantitative importance of the various parameters discussed above, we present 
some numerical examples. All simulations are performed with regard to a benchmark case (see 
Appendix C for a description of the benchmark parameters).13 In order to check the sensitivity of the 
thresholds to these benchmark parameters, optimal decision rules are then computed for alternative 
parameter combinations.14   
Figure 1 provides a sensitivity analysis of the thresholds with respect to l1 and l2, i.e. we illustrate the 
impact of alternative arrival rates upon the optimal investment and dis-investment thresholds. The 3-D 
graphs clearly indicate the entire no-action areas. If l2 increases, then the g+ investment threshold will 
rise – firms will be more reluctant to invest to avoid getting caught with too much capital, should the 
future turn out worse than expected. By contrast, if the future turns out better than expected, the firm 
can just add more capital as needed. The implication is that the textbook net present value rule is 
                                                                 
13 The numerical boundary value problem is solved with the method of Newton-Raphson for nonlinear systems. 
A description of the numerical programming technique is provided in Press et al. (2002). 
14 Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates of the impact of 
political uncertainty, but rather to illustrate the qualitative predictions of the model and to identify key features 
of the framework. 
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blantly inappropriate in any context other than the unrealistic setting where sunk costs are negligible 
and there is certainty regarding the determinants of the profitability of the project to be undertaken. On 
the contrary, if l1 increases, then the g+ threshold declines. The less accentuated curvature of the g+ 
threshold with respect to l1 results because there are two offsetting effects. First, an increase in l1 
increases the option value of waiting and therefore delays investment decisions. On the other hand, a 
higher l1 parameter raises expected profitability and, ceteris paribus, the desired capital stock.15 This 
effect goes in opposite direction to the threshold effect above, and the net result is in general 
indeterminate. This qualitative result is consistent with Bernanke´s (1983) bad news principle: under 
investment irreversibility, bad events affect the firm´s propensity to invest.16  
 
Figure 1: The Threshold Values as Functions of l1 and l2 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Let us next examine how the drift term affects the firm´s decision. Figure 2 shows the thresholds for h 
= 0.00. This makes no meaningful difference to the profit maximising tactic except that political 
instability poses an even more formidable obstacle to FDI decisions.17 
 
                                                                 
15 Or said another way, in some cases the g+ threshold falls as uncertainty increases; the threshold elasticity of 
investment is negative. One may describe this behaviour as inferior. 
16 As stated by Bernanke (1983, pp. 92-93), „The investor who declines to invest in project i today (...) gives up 
short-run returns. In exchange for the sacrifice, he enters period t+1 with an „option“ (...). In deciding whether to 
„buy“ this option (...), the investor therefore considers only „bad news“ states in t+1 (...)“.  
17 These large premia are consistent with the high hurdle rates applied in practice by firm managers when 
assessing investment projects. 
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Figure 2: The Threshold Values as Functions of l1 and l2 for h = 0.00 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Figure 3: The Threshold Values as Functions of f1 and f2 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Figure 3 shows how the magnitude of the jumps (respresented by f1 and f2) affects investment. Two 
main messages emerge from Figure 3. The first concerns the investment threshold: The simulations 
suggest that perceived downside risks act as an important deterrent to FDI. Pari passu, an unreliable 
political environment system translates into a higher no action area and hence lowers FDI and the 
efficiency in the host country´s economy.18 This implies that a nation that takes steps to increase the 
degree of political stability could expect significant increases in the level of FDI into their country. 
                                                                 
18 This calibration result is consistent with the empirical fact that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
accounted for the majority of FDI inflows in the Central Eastern European region in the 1990s. These countries 
have been widely recognised as the leaders of the liberalising reforms in Central Europe having implemented 
policies creating a balanced and rather solid macroeconomic and political environment. 
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This increased investment translates into more resources, which in turn increases social welfare and 
economic efficiency. The impact of f1 on the optimal investment rule is non-monotonic. This is due to 
the fact that there are two terms that depend upon f1. The first of these is the option value of waiting 
which is increasing in f1 while the second is expected profitability. As a result, at first glance the 
relation between f1 and g+ is ambiguous. The second argument concerns the dis-investment threshold. 
Again the result is that the threshold for dis-investment is rather flat. 
Let us now consider changes in s. In other words, we analyse the sensitivity of the optimal thresholds 
with respect to changes in the volatility of the geometric Brownian motion representing demand and/or 
exchange rate uncertainty for given values of political uncertainty. As in the existing literature, we 
find that the threshold value at which investment takes place is increasing in the “noisiness” level even 
though the firm is risk neutral. In volatile environments, the best tactic is to keep options open and 
await new information rather than commit an investment today. 19 
 
Figure 4: The Threshold Values as Function of s 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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We end the section considering pK
-  changes. Intuition tells us that increasing irreversibility 
(lower pK
- ) should lower the “exit incentive”. Indeed this is the case, as depicted in Figure 5. We find 
that the threshold at which dis-investment takes place is decreasing in pK
-  (the degree of 
reversibility). For pK
-  close to zero, capital is almost completely irreversible. The numerical results 
indicate that this effect alone tends to increase the no action zone substantially. 
 
                                                                 
19 Figure 4 reveals that the g+ surface is much more sensitive to changes in s  than the g- surface. 
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Figure 5: The Threshold Values as Function of p- 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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5. Summary Remarks and Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we have looked in detail at the link between political uncertainty and foreign direct 
investment spending by employing ideas and analytical techniques developed in the real options 
literature. Of course, the model deve loped in this paper is stylized and may not capture all of the 
details. However, our model clarifies thinking on the inter-linkages between policy uncertainty, option 
value and the timing of FDI at the firm level. The main result is that an uncertain polit ical environment 
exerts a non-trivial influence upon FDI decisions. This appealing insight can enrich theory by 
clarifying issues concerning the "if" and "when" of FDI.20 
An important feature of our model is that the opportunity to invest or disinvest is assigned to one firm 
only, i.e. the analysis was decidedly partial equilibrium. Yet it is obvious that one cannot just translate 
mechanically the above microeconomic results to aggregate investment. One implication is that 
waiting may no longer be feasible when FDI is available to any of several firms. There can be strategic 
situations with more firms, where moving first may be profitable. In practice, these considerations 
may call for early investment at the same time that political uncertainty suggests wait ing. The optimal 
choice would then have to balance the two. To assess the role of political uncertainty in aggregate 
investment it is also essential to take explicitly into consideration the heterogeneity of individual 
firms´ investment decisions. Bertola and Caballero (1994) have explored the implications of 
                                                                 
20 Empirical estimation of the suggested model is, however, far from straightforward, even after abstracting from 
data limitations (which can be acute because the model is micro-based). First, one would need information about 
the manner in which firms form expectations of future political events, as opposed to the changes per se. Second, 
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irreversibility for aggregate investment in a model in which individual firms´ investment proceeds in 
discontinuous bursts. Individual investments are not synchronized, and firms are subject to 
idiosyncratic uncertainty in addition to aggregate uncertainty. As a result, aggregate uncertainty shows 
smoothness and a shock may take a long time to develop its full impact. Finally, the discussion 
ignored the ability of, and incentives for, firms to diversify their capital stock internationally in times 
of political uncertainty. This diversification may partially offset the forces highlighted here. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
in reality there are a number of alternative modes to service a foreign market, and failure to consider the entire 
range of feasible options might lead to a misspecification of the reduced-form empirical equations. 
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Appendix A: The Derivation of Equation (17) 
 
Equation (16) is a differential equation of a familiar form. Our experience suggests that the solution 
takes the form 
 
(A1) aBgKq -= 1 . 
 
Then, we have ag BKq
-= 1 , 0=ggq , ( ) aK BgKaq --= 1 , ( )( ) ( ) aKBggq --=- 122 11 ff , and 
( )( ) ( ) aKBggq -+=+ 111 11 ff . Substituting into equation (16) yields 
 
(A2) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]2211 111 flflhdd ----+++--=+ BBBBBBaaBr . 
 
Rearranging and collecting terms yields 
2211 flflhd +--+
=
ar
a
B . 
 
It is then straightforward to obtain equation (17). 
 
Appendix B: The Derivation of Equations (18) and (19) 
 
The homogeneous part of the Bellman’s equation is denoted by: 
 
(B1) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]22112
2
11
2
flfl
s
hdd ----++++-=+ gqqqgqqggqKqqr gggK  
 
The homogeneous solutions should have the same components as in particular solutions. Assume the 
homogeneous solutions have the functional form 
 
(B2) ( )bagKAq -= 1 . 
 
Then we have 
 
(B3) ( ) ( )bdbd aK gKAaKq ---=- 11 , 
 
(B4) ( )bhbh ag gKAgq -= 1 , 
 
(B5)  ( ) ( )bbbss agg gKAggq --= 122 12
1
2
1 , 
 
(B6) ( )( ) ( ) ( )bbff agKAgq -+=+ 111 11 , 
 
(B7)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )bbff agKAgq --=- 122 11 . 
 
Now substitute into equation (B1). It is straightforward to obtain the following characteristic equation: 
 
(B8) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) 0111111
2
1
2211
2 =+-----+++--- dflflhbdbbbs bb ra  
 
Equation (19) is thus proven.  
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Appendix C: The Benchmark Parameters  
 
We set the central benchmark parameters as follows: s  = 0.18, h = 0.03, r = 0.03, d = 0.08, l1 = 0.05, 
l2 = 0.05, f1 = 0.2, f2 = 0.2, +Kp  = 1.0, 
-
Kp  =  0.2, a = 0.65, and the initial value for capital (K) = 100. 
All these parameters seem reasonable on an annual basis. To motivate the analysis of policy 
uncertainty, special attention has to be paid to the calibration of the Poisson processes. The Poisson 
process implies that the likelihood of a policy change is determined by the arrival rate l. This means 
that the time t one has to wait for the switch event to occur is a random variable whose distribution is 
exponential with parameter l: 
 
(C1) { } e ttbeforeoccurseventprobtF l--=º 1)(  
 
The corresponding probability density is 
 
(C2) e ttFtf l l-=¢º )()(  
 
In other words, the probability that the event will occur sometime within the short interval between t0 
and t0+dt is approximately le-ltdt. In particular, the probability that it will occur within dt from now 
(when t = 0) is approximately ldt. In this sense l is the probability per unit of time. Moreover, the 
number of policy changes (x) that will take place over any interval of length D is distributed according 
to the Poisson distribution 
 
(C3)  { } ( )
!
)(
x
occureventxprobxg e
x D-D
=º
ll  
 
whose expected value is the arrival rate times the length of the interval lD. We can back out from 
equation (C3) the agent´s beliefs about policy changes. As a guide to calibration, the Table below 
provides the probabilities that either one (x = 1) or three (x = 3) jumps will occur within 5 years (D = 
5) or 10 years (D = 10) for the three arrival rates l = 0.01, l = 0.05 and l = 0.10, respectively. For 
example, for l = 0.05 the probability that one jump will occur within 5 years is 19.5 percent.  
 
Table: Jump Probabilities for the Poisson Process 
 l = 0.01  l = 0.05 l = 0.10 
prob{1 event in 5 years} 0.048 0.195 0.303 
prob{3 events in 5 years} 0.000002 0.002 0.013 
prob{1 event in 10 years} 0.090 0.303 0.368 
prob{3 events in 10 years} 0.0001 0.012 0.061 
 
The results indicate that for l = 0.10 the firm faces a very substantial exposure to political risk. The 
variability embodied with l1,2 = 0.05 therefore seems to be a plausible and realistic parameterization 
of the model for developing countries and and transition economies. 
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